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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the practical and philosophical strengths 
of adopting Luciano Floridi’s “general definition of information” 
(GDI) for use in the information sciences (IS). Many definitions of 
information have been proposed, but little work has been done to de-
termine which definitions are most coherent or useful. Consequently, 
doubts have been cast on the necessity and possibility of finding a 
definition. In response to these doubts, the paper shows how items 
and events central to IS are adequately described by Floridi’s concep-
tion of information, and demonstrates how it helps clarify the muddy 
theoretical framework resulting from the many previous definitions. 
To this end, it analyzes definitions, popular in IS, that conceive of 
information as energy, processes, knowledge, and physical objects. 
The paper finds that each of these definitions produces problematic 
or counterintuitive implications that the GDI suitably accounts for. 
It discusses the role of truth in IS, notes why the GDI is preferable 
to its truth-requiring variant, and ends with comments about the 
import of such a theory for IS research and practice.
Introduction
In this paper, we defend the notion that Luciano Floridi’s “general defini-
tion of information” (GDI) is an attractive definition for use in the infor-
mation sciences (IS). This defense is carried out by demonstrating the 
theoretical and applied advantages of the definition; we discuss several 
common items and events of concern that are adequately described by 
the GDI, as well as analyze how it helps to clarify the theoretical frame-
work resulting from the many previous definitions.
Within IS, including informatics and library and information studies 
(LIS), it is generally agreed that the theories of the field should be able to 
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cogently describe what exactly information is. Much work has been done 
toward this, including attempts to understand information through both 
broad characterizations and formal definitions. Many definitions have 
been created intending to meet the theoretical and practical needs of 
IS. More definitions still have been advanced for uses in other fields, and 
some of these have been examined with interest by IS theorists for pos-
sible appropriation into the theory of our field. Yet, it is unclear which 
definition is most coherent or useful, as little work has been done to de-
termine this. As the resulting theoretical picture is unclear, doubts have 
been cast on the necessity of a definition at all and also on the possibility 
of a satisfactory one. 
In response to such concerns, we argue that a satisfactory definition of 
information is desirable and that the GDI is tenable for use in IS. Rather 
than simply examine yet another definition of information, we demon-
strate how this conception helps us to understand the theoretical picture 
produced by previous definitions. We identify where several popular defi-
nitions fall short by critically comparing Floridi’s views to those that in-
fluenced IS before it. To demonstrate the practical use of his views, we 
use it to explicate several examples of items and events that commonly 
concern IS, which should make the definition palpable. We then discuss 
why the GDI is better suited for use in IS than its truth-requiring variant, 
the strongly “semantic definition of information” (SDI). We end the pa-
per with comments about the import of such a theory for IS researchers 
and practitioners.
Previous Definitions of Information
Several reviews of definitions, characterizations, and conceptions of in-
formation have been given, ranging from article-length syntheses (Bates, 
2005; Budd, 2011; Furner, 2004b; Karamuftuoglu, 2009; Kaye, 1995; Mad-
den, 2000; McCreadie & Rice, 1999; Qvortrup, 1993; Rowley, 1998) to 
comprehensive, chapter-length surveys (Bates, 2010; Bremer & Cohnitz, 
2004; Capurro & Hjørland, 2003; Floridi, 2004d, 2010a; Furner, 2010; 
Ramage & Chapman, 2011). Such reviews vary in their comprehensive-
ness of definitions and inclusivity of various relevant fields, but most start 
in the 1940s, with Shannon and Weaver’s mathematical communication 
theory (MTC). MTC is an approach to formalizing and quantifying in-
formation as it features in acts of communication (Shannon & Weaver, 
1948; Weaver & Shannon, 1949). The development of MTC also served 
as a backdrop for the creation of two other movements to characterize 
information: the “probabilistic semantic” view characterizes informa-
tion as meaningful content in a probabilistic space, where there is an 
inverse relation between the amount of information in some event p to 
the probability of p (Bar-Hillel, 1964; Bar-Hillel & Carnap, 1953; Dretske, 
1981); the “systemic” view characterizes information as states of space and 
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consistency in some system (Barwise & Perry, 1985; Devlin, 1995; Israel & 
Perry, 1990). 
Together, these three views can be thought to comprise a physics of in-
formation and are still used fruitfully in applications of communications 
theory, technology, and mathematics. These views can be grouped with the 
conceptions of information used, often implicitly, in biology, computer 
science, and physics: such conceptions aim to quantify information, often 
so that it may feature in formal equations1 rather than aiming to strictly 
identify its nature in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.2 Per-
haps as a consequence, MTC and its contemporaries are no longer em-
blematic of the views of information held by IS researchers and profes-
sionals; rather, these accounts have been joined by many definitions and 
characterizations that have since been suggested and advanced. As a start, 
here are several accounts intended for use in IS, put briefly. Information is
•	 a	difference	that	makes	a	difference	(Bateson,	1972);3
•	 that	which	changes	a	knowledge	structure	(Brookes,	1980);
•	 a	thing,	process,	or	knowledge	(Buckland,	1991);
•	 an	evolutionary	process	(Fleissner	&	Hofkirchner,	1996);
•	 that	which	describes	a	process,	its	input,	and	output	(Losee,	1997);
•	 a	stimulus	from	one	system	that	affects	the	relationship	between	itself	
and another (Madden, 2000);
•	 a	continuum	of	data	that	has	been	assigned	meaning	(Herold,	2003);
•	 evidence	(Furner,	2004a);
•	 the	pattern	of	organization	of	matter	and	energy	(Bates,	2005);
•	 the	same	pattern,	once	assigned	meaning	(Bates,	2006);
•	 the	 recorded	 counterpart	 of	 true	 propositions;	 weak	 knowledge	 
(Frické, 2009);
•	 meaningful	communicative	action	that	aims	at	truth	(Budd,	2011);	and
•	 a	sign	(Mai,	2013).
Still more definitions exist, ranging from complex mathematical formal-
izations to quotidian ambiguities and trivial truths. (See Bates [2005] for 
over twenty additional definitions; Zins [2007] for definitions based on 
the impressions of forty-five IS researchers; and Sommaruga [2009] for 
many formalizations.)
Despite the impressive number of definitions, it remains unclear what 
they individually or collectively allow us to confidently say about infor-
mation. Definitions are rarely presented with examinations of how they 
overlap with or contradict other definitions, and surprisingly little direct 
disagreement and debate about the definitions has occurred among IS 
theorists. This problem is well-illustrated by Schrader’s (1983) expres-
sion of frustration at the multiplicity of vague and bizarre definitions of 
information available as early as 1983. Meadow and Yuan (1997) offer 
a rare attempt to organize and interrelate many previous theories, but 
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these theories have since been joined by two decades of additions. As with 
the many models of information behavior, one could say that the field 
suffers from a “many definitions problem”: a concern for the diminishing 
value of each new definition could be reasonably expressed, and sense 
needs to be made of the overall picture. That the many definitions to-
gether produce an unclear theoretical picture would be true even if every 
definition given was perfectly adequate for its intended uses, although we 
argue below that such is not the case. Both the cause and seeming effect 
of this unclear picture is that there is a lack of consensus in IS about how 
to define information.
In light of this unclear theoretical picture, as well as the difficulty of 
reaching a satisfactory definition of information, some authors doubt that 
a suitable definition is possible, and some argue for abandoning the effort 
altogether. This option deserves consideration, so we turn to it next.
Is a Definition Possible, Necessary, or Desirable?
To sufficiently define information has challenged not only IS, as we have 
noted, but many other fields, and these challenges have lead to doubts 
that a satisfactory definition is possible or necessary. The broad doubt is 
that a discipline-independent definition or “unified theory of informa-
tion” (UTI) could define information sufficiently to be used in any field 
or context. Is a UTI possible? Is it possible for a conceptual analysis of 
information to give us necessary and sufficient conditions that satisfy the 
constraints of all the various fields in which information features? As in-
teresting as this question is, it may not benefit IS—primarily an applied 
discipline—to wait for such an account to come along, as defining satis-
factorily such fundamental ideas is notoriously difficult. For example, the 
debate in epistemology about a definition of knowledge is still not settled: 
although knowledge has been examined for over two millennia, the stan-
dard definition was successfully overturned just fifty years ago (Gettier, 
1963). Given the various applications of the concept of information, it too 
may be reasonably expected to be subjected to a long and winding analysis. 
It is possible that if philosophers could reach consensus on how to define 
information, such a definition could be broad enough to be discipline- 
independent and satisfactory in any context. Consensus of any sort is 
rarely reached in philosophy, however, and so the prospects for a UTI 
are bleak. Deeper analyses of the challenges of finding a UTI are given in 
Capurro, Fleissner, and Hofkirchner (1997); Fleissner and Hofkirchner 
(1996); Losee (1997); and Sloman (2011).
The more worrisome doubt is that IS should bother to define infor-
mation for its own purposes. Given the success and adoption of MTC, 
we find it uncontroversial to conclude that field-dependent definitions of 
information are possible, and we later identify one for use in IS. Some IS 
researchers, however, have been challenging the necessity of such a defi-
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nition; even Brookes (1974), despite his efforts to conceptualize and for-
malize a definition of information, eventually encouraged the field away 
from a strict definition and toward a more relaxed use of the term. Two 
further similar sentiments have followed.
Furner (2004b) suggests that the definition project is not necessary, 
and to demonstrate this, he describes thoroughly the field of IS without 
any recourse to relying upon a definition of information. How much are 
we to conclude from the fact that a field can be described by drawing 
on the language of other fields? We find this question hard to answer 
with confidence. Prima facie, it seems plausible that many fields may be 
adequately described in a similar manner—that is, without recourse to 
some concept that is a prominent phenomenon. Despite this, it is evi-
dently useful to rely upon and utilize such concepts. For example, pri-
or to Bolzano and Cauchy, no rigorous definition of convergent series was 
available; mathematicians knew that certain series converged, but could 
not produce a general, formal demonstration (Cleave, 1971; Grattan- 
Guinness, 1970). When Bolzano and Cauchy provided a rigorous defini-
tion for convergence, mathematics and physics advanced and important 
further formal definitions (for example, the root and ratio tests) were 
then established (Knopp, 1956). Many common theorems in use today 
would not exist or be provable if a suitable definition had not been pro-
duced. Similarly, the interpretation of the results of experiments depends 
heavily on definitions of key concepts. With one definition of freedom of the 
will, it can be argued that the results of neuroscience experiments imply 
that there is no such thing as free will; with another definition, free will is 
tenable (O’Connor, 2009). 
The consequences of having no definition are not hard to imagine for 
IS. Consider a case study meant to identify the information provided by a 
reference librarian. What should be counted as information for the pur-
poses of such a study? Is a blank piece of paper, given to a patron for note-
taking, to be counted? Is a provided internet URL to be counted? What 
of a book of poetry? Suppose a book is provided by the librarian, but the 
patron has already read it very closely: Does this count as information pro-
vided? The answers to these depend on the definition employed, and so 
the data collected and the findings also depend on the definition.
An interesting point to be gleaned from Furner’s (2004b) thesis is that 
it is more convenient to describe our field without reference to informa-
tion than it is to actually define it. Although convenient, this simply shifts 
the problem onto other fundamental concepts; for example, in describ-
ing information-less IS, Furner makes reference to data. Data are gener-
ally considered to be the base of the data–information–knowledge hierar-
chy and feature in many accounts of information (Frické, 2009). By using 
data to describe the concerns of IS, he illustrates not only the usefulness 
of the term but also the necessity of fundamental terms.
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Hartel, Pollock, and Noone (2013) provide an additional critique 
to the tradition of defining information. Motivated by perceived short-
comings of the previous attempts to understand information by means 
of propositions and analysis, they embark on an arts-informed, visual ap-
proach to understanding information by analyzing 4-by-4-inch drawings 
produced by iSchool graduate students when asked “What is informa-
tion?” In justifying their project, Hartel and colleagues note that previous 
definitions share shortcomings because of their approach: they are schol-
arly and therefore narrowly drawn, word-based in a multimedia society 
and therefore inaccessible, and singular in their perspectives. Hartel and 
colleagues’ project, by contrast, is intended to be egalitarian and visual 
and embrace many perspectives on information.
Examining common parlance and thought seems an intuitive way to 
begin understanding how to broadly characterize a phenomenon, and 
their study identified many examples of the various common perceptions 
of what information is. However, that there are many technical and philo-
sophical definitions of information available demonstrates that discussion 
of how to define information has moved beyond the point of character-
ization, and this is why the “shortcomings” that Hartel and colleagues 
have identified in the previous literature can hardly be called such: deep, 
critical understanding requires conceptual analysis, which necessitates 
words, scholarship, and identifiable theses. This is particularly true for 
the analysis of a concept like information, which has proven so difficult to 
adequately define. 
Despite the difficulties and doubts surrounding defining information, 
many definitions have been advanced, and the analysis of what informa-
tion is continues. Through the considerations stated here, we believe a 
definition that is useful and theoretically rigorous is desirable; we also 
believe that one is available, as we will now discuss.
A Semantic Conception of Information
Semantic conceptions of information view information as being com-
posed of meaningful content. There are several such conceptions, which 
appear in various forms in works by Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953), Dretske 
(1981), and Floridi (2004c, 2005). For detailed introductions to the nu-
anced differences of various semantic conceptions of information, see 
Floridi (2011b). Of these views, the one that concerns us here is devel-
oped by Floridi and specifically characterizes the content of information 
as well-formed and meaningful data. He has argued that such a concep-
tion is particularly appropriate for IS, citing the applicability of the phi-
losophy of information (PI) as a foundational grounding for IS (2002, 
2004a), although not without resistance (for example, Cornelius, 2004). 
Examples of recent research topics regarding Floridi’s view of informa-
tion include formalizing it (Allo, 2008), examining its implications for 
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precognitive processing (Vakarelov, 2010), and examining its implications 
for verificationist theories of truth (Floridi, 2011a).
This conception has resulted in two definitions of information, called 
the “general definition of information” (GDI, although sometimes it is 
called the “standard definition of information,” which may cause confu-
sion with the following acronym) and the “strongly semantic definition of 
information” (SDI, also sometimes called the “specific definition of infor-
mation”) (Floridi, 2004c, 2005). Since both the GDI and SDI rely upon a 
definition of data, it deserves some attention before we move on. 
Both definitions hold a diaphoric definition of data: data are differ-
ences. A single datum can thus be understood as a single value or set 
of values: for example, the state of something being on, the color red, 
a particular person named Kevin, the time 12:00 pm, a stretch of time 
from 12:00–5:00 pm, the text “12:00–5:00 pm” that refers to that stretch of 
time, some particular glass, glasses in general, the geometric concept of 
a circle, pain, the words president and that (for example, as an indexical), 
three hundred, the blinking of a light, smoke, and so on. The examples of 
data given here carry conventional meaning, whether we consider them 
as words or as the actual instances in the world that the words refer to, but 
data may not always be meaningful: “F33R” is an instance of data, despite 
having no intended meaning. Red is identifiable as red, in contrast to and 
as different from nonred values. It is a feature of data that they provide 
constraints and affordances, allowing and disallowing various informa-
tion, such as conclusions, to be gleaned from or made with them. Gener-
ally speaking, this definition of data matches our intuitions about them 
that are revealed by general uses of the word in IS practice, such as when 
referring to recorded data like the values in a spreadsheet cell (“$5”) or 
database property (“Yes”).
With data thoroughly defined, we can now examine the two definitions 
of information produced by Floridi’s view of information as meaningful, 
well-formed data, which we are here endorsing for use in IS research and 
practice. Although the above examples and explanations are our own, 
the definitions are taken from Floridi (2010a, p. 19), where they are ex-
plained at greater depth. The GDI defines x as information if and only if
GDI.1: x consists of one or more data;
GDI.2: the data are well-formed; and
GDI.3: the data are meaningful.
The first criterion requires that there be present at least one datum, un-
derstood as we have described above. The second requires that any present 
data be well-formed—that is, present together in a way that adheres to the 
rules that govern a system or language in which they feature, such as rules 
of syntax in a spoken language or programming language or the spatial 
rules governing a 3D virtual environment. The third criterion requires that 
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the data be meaningful: that they offer semantic representation according 
to the system from which they are derived; in the English language, “trois 
cents” is not meaningful, but “three hundred” is. Of the examples of data 
given above, some data may additionally be information in certain circum-
stances; for example, “12:00 pm” as an answer to a question about time 
or even simply “Hello,” as they form complete and meaningful sentences. 
The words that, dog, and black are data and may be well-formed, such as in 
a sentence: “That dog is black”; they are also meaningful in some system—
namely, the English language. These facts about the data let us confidently 
say that they afford some information that some dog in question is black.
Information need not be propositional or even linguistic, however; the 
state of a light may be regarded as data, and it may afford information 
about the state of your laptop battery. The light’s blinking is meant to be 
meaningful to the laptop owner, and in the system of communication de-
signed by the laptop’s engineers, blinking does not break any syntactical 
rules, whereas intermittent blinking might. Semantic conceptions further 
distinguish between factual information, such as “That dog is black” and 
instructional information, such as the contents of a manual that instructs 
you how to build a bookcase. The SDI is nearly identical to the GDI, ex-
cept for a fourth criterion. The SDI defines x as information if and only if 
(from Floridi [2011b] and examined in depth in Floridi [2005])
SDI.1: x consists of one or more data;
SDI.2: the data are well-formed;
SDI.3: the data are meaningful; and
SDI.4: x is true.
The additional criterion requires that information be true to qualify as 
information. We will return to this definition later. 
In either form (GDI or SDI), the semantic conception of information 
may seem somewhat familiar to followers of the definition debate in IS. 
First, it shares some features with notions of information as propositions, 
given by Derr (1985) and Fox (1983), that have been previously examined 
(Bates, 2005). It goes further, however, to include nonpropositional infor-
mation and so avoids critiques like those by Kornai (2008) that there is 
more to a definition of information than propositions only. Floridi’s con-
ception also matches an intuitive and broad definition given by Bateson 
(1972), which is popular in IS: “information is a difference which makes 
a difference” (p. 448). In terms of a view of information as meaningful 
data, the first difference (“a difference that . . .”) is at least one datum, 
and the second (“. . . makes a difference”) refers to its meaningfulness in 
some system. Lastly, it matches very closely a definition given briefly and 
without explication in a dictionary of computing that intuits information 
as “data processed and assembled into a meaningful form” (Meadows, 
Gordon, & Singleton, 1984).
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The account has some intuitive strength, but what makes it distinctly 
worth promoting given the many other definitions? Furner (2004b) has 
noted that three criteria are relevant to evaluating a definition: coher-
ence, parsimony, and utility. In what follows, the GDI will be assessed 
along these three dimensions in relation to other theories of the field. 
To start, it is worthwhile noting that Floridi’s semantic conception of in-
formation includes a coherent definition of data. This benefit should not 
be underestimated. Furner notes that a good theory should go beyond 
simply defining an item, but to explain the component process of how it 
qualifies for that definition (p. 444). By giving a concrete analysis of data 
and linking it coherently to information, Floridi’s conception does pro-
vide this extra layer of explanation; in doing so, it contributes an under-
standing of an additional and important piece of the data–information– 
knowledge construct.
We mentioned earlier that little analytical work has been done to ex-
amine the usefulness, rigor, and soundness of previous definitions. Next, 
we illustrate the usefulness of the GDI for IS contexts by showing how it 
aids in the understanding of “what went wrong” in counter-intuitive im-
plications of ubiquitous definitions in IS, leaving us with a clearer under-
standing of what we can actually regard as information in each case. Much 
of what will be said also applies to the SDI, as GDI and SDI share most of 
their criteria, but we will withhold discussing the unique details of the SDI 
until the general approach has been shown to be useful.
Information as Thing, Knowledge, and Process
In “Information as Thing,” Buckland (1991) differentiates three ways in 
which information is explicitly and implicitly defined within IS practice 
and theory. Although Buckland was aware that the overall account was 
likely to disappoint the pickiest of theorists, the definitions he detailed 
nonetheless represent the most common approaches taken by previous 
definitions. This makes Buckland’s account a useful starting point for crit-
ical examination, as our examinations of these three senses apply to many 
definitions that fit within the three categories.
The first sense considers information to be information-as-process: the act 
of informing. Definitions that regard information itself as a process (for 
example, the act of informing or becoming informed) quickly encounter 
a challenge: that something we intuitively consider information, like how 
one might go about utilizing the large quantities of data present on the 
internet, would cease to be information at all if the related processes (for 
example, of seeking it) ended. In other words, if the seeker abandons 
the search for some information, the process is over, and the information 
is presumably therefore gone. It is counterintuitive to think that we can 
have direct effect on the existence of information by simply starting or 
stopping some process related to it, such as that of seeking it. The GDI 
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avoids this issue, as it can be explicated with “genetic neutrality” (Floridi, 
2013)—namely, the idea that data may be meaningful independent of any 
informee, and therefore information about a topic not as yet researched 
can still be considered information.
The second sense of information considers information to be information- 
as-knowledge. Definitions that equate information with knowledge encoun-
ter various problems because it is unclear how they can account for ex-
amples of information that do not seem to be knowledge. For example, 
instructions for configuring a search engine seem to be information, but 
the instruction “import the data set via a series of XML statements” does 
not clearly qualify as a justified, true belief. One might note that justified, 
true belief is just one definition of knowledge, and although it is the most 
commonly used, it is not free of problems. This is true enough, but vari-
ous other definitions of knowledge vary only with regards to knowledge 
being true or justified; all agree that there must be a belief for there to be 
knowledge. In the case of instructions, “import the data set” is not a belief 
or even a believable claim; it makes little sense to say that one believes that 
“import the data set.”
Less narrow approaches to information-as-knowledge might avoid this 
issue by defining information less strictly, equating it not with knowledge 
but instead with that which is known. In this case, information need not 
technically qualify as knowledge, but may still be known in some less 
specific way, such as “that which is perceived in information-as-process” 
(Buckland, 1991, p. 351). This too entails some worrisome complications, 
for there are examples that intuitively qualify as information though are 
not known. For example, we may say that a librarian seeks some informa- 
tion, such as which item would best complete a collection. Since this infor-
mation is not known, even if simply “not yet known,” this special version 
of the second sense would prevent us from regarding it as information.
Further refinements to sense 2 may be made in an attempt to avoid 
these problems but lead to further problems of their own. One might sug-
gest that not-known information is still information-as-knowledge, but it is 
information-as-future-knowledge. This too is problematic: in the event that no 
one is successful in obtaining the future knowledge, it would then not be 
information. This, in turn, implies that either the information has ceased 
to exist, which we warned about in our analysis of sense 1, or worse, that 
those who were unsuccessful in obtaining it were never seeking it to be-
gin with. What, then, were they seeking? It seems wrong to state that they 
were never seeking anything.
The potential quibbles about information-as-knowledge illustrate the 
risks of that view: it requires a sound definition of knowledge, but the 
disputes of philosophy suggest that one does not exist. The more oddi-
ties within the chosen definition of knowledge, the greater the risk it will 
produce unusual conclusions regarding information, future or otherwise. 
388 library trends/winter 2015
Lastly, equating information with knowledge risks losing the nuances be-
tween domains like information management and knowledge manage-
ment that have unique focuses. In sum, these considerations seem to im-
ply that information-as-knowledge is not an attractive view.
The GDI allows for x to be information regardless of its current or fu-
ture status of being or not being knowledge. Sense 2 is not without value, 
however, as we certainly may want to discuss some information content 
that is, incidentally, also knowledge content. Preferably so, rather than 
regarding this information as knowledge or vice versa, which serves as 
a misleading shorthand for referring to some content x, where x is both 
information and knowledge.
Buckland defines the third sense, information-as-thing, as what we com-
monly call computer data, textual documents, and informative physical 
objects, such as fossils. This sense, he says, is the sense of information 
most relevant to IS research and practice. Sense 3 represents formal and 
implicit definitions that identify physical objects as information. That a 
physical object or thing itself could be information (which is otherwise 
considered abstract) seems to us an unusual claim: sense 3 seems obvi-
ously to only identify examples where information is present, rather than 
the information itself. Nonetheless, it represents a common implicit and 
explicit (Jones, 2010) view that an object is indeed information, and so 
deserves treatment. 
First, that information-as-thing is the most important or frequent con-
cern of IS practices may be inaccurate, and thus it may not be the best 
candidate for a characterization of information. Although the physicality 
or physical representation of some information is a frequent and impor-
tant focus of IS, in many cases, the value of the physical representation 
is first and foremost its content, and not the physical embodiment of it. 
Consider an end-user, such as a tech-savvy library patron, searching for 
information about World War II. In many cases, it is likely not of much 
interest to the patron if they are given a hardcopy of a textbook or an 
eBook; interest in the embodiment of some information itself is spurned 
only when we are first interested in the content; this alone does not make 
information-as-thing an untenable view, however.
Second, to regard physical objects as information is intuitive, but 
not clear; it is intuitive because we often speak about physical objects 
as though they are information, particularly in cases of digital media or 
when scientific knowledge may be gained from some interesting natural 
phenomenon. For example, we may say that a DVD-ROM disc is infor-
mation or that a stem of the quaking aspen is information. It is unclear, 
however, once one moves beyond a face-value interpretation—what in-
formation could an object itself be? For example, what information is a 
DVD-ROM? One may think that the information is that which is or could 
be contained, held, represented, or transmitted by the DVD. These are 
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reasonable thoughts, but that which is contained by an object is not the 
object itself; water is not the bottle that contains it. One may think of the 
information “the DVD has a certain weight, a certain color, and certain 
properties like flexibility, reflection,” and so on, but those are traits of 
the DVD and not information that the DVD itself is, and this is the claim 
of information-as-thing. If, after all, information-as-thing is meant to pro-
vide a definition of information rather than merely providing examples 
of places where information exists, then it must state that the thing is the 
information.
Lastly, a more technical issue in identifying things as information is 
found in the implications of the view: if things are information, two identi-
cal things should afford identical information, but they may actually yield 
different information in different contexts, such as different times or 
places. For example, a copy of The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes that is set 
on a table in Paris may yield different information than an identical copy 
set on a desk in Berlin: while the former affords the information that it is 
in France, the other does not. Further, this seems true of one object placed 
into two different times or places: it will yield different information within 
the different contexts but cannot be identical to two bits of information 
that are nonidentical to each other. Objections may be made by means of 
metaphysical views that identities do not persist across time or similarly 
across space, but these objections illustrate the difficulty in equating in-
formation with things: theories of identity (of things or otherwise) are 
contentious, and so it is better to give a definition of information in terms 
of consisting of data than to equate information with things themselves.
The GDI, in contrast, allows that information may be represented, 
such as by electrons on a hard drive that represent information in a file, 
or by a blinking light, or by one of many other modes of representation 
and communication, without allowing that the drive itself or light itself 
is an instance of information. Buckland (1991) said of Meadows and col-
leagues’ definition of information, which matches closely the GDI, that 
it “leaves unanswered the question of what to call . . . informative things” 
(p. 356). Given this common use of the word, it may seem counter- 
intuitive to say that a fossil is not identical to information and is not even 
an instance of information. What we have shown here is that “informative 
things” is less problematic than three popular alternatives, and we can 
instead call documents and fossils carriers of information. A DVD-ROM 
is not information, but it carries information and is itself a meaningful 
datum that may combine with other meaningful data in a well-formed 
manner, thus affording information.
Through this explication, we see that although information-as-process, 
-knowledge, and -thing as they have been previously defined make for 
problematic definitions of information, alone, none of these views are 
sufficient accounts of information. Taken together, they form a more 
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comprehensive account but one that is a characterization of some of the 
instances of information that may be found rather than a definition or 
analysis of what these instances have in common.
Information as a Pattern of Energy or Matter
Buckland’s summary and categorization of previous definitions has since 
been made incomplete, as new kinds of definitions have recently been 
given. In two companion papers, Bates (2005, 2006) has been motivated 
by similar concerns about the usefulness of many definitions, and thus 
emphasizes the utility to be found in developing an existing, but not fully 
explicated, definition given by Parker (1974). This usefulness, she con-
tends, is due to the definition being grounded in an evolutionary biology 
framework that concerns how and why animals perceive and process infor-
mation.4 Bates relates Information 1, described by Parker and others, as 
“the pattern of organization of matter and energy” (Parker, 1974, p. 10), 
and then refines this into Information 2: “some pattern of organization of 
matter and energy that has been given meaning by a living being” (Bates, 
2006, p. 1042). Bates is aware that a good definition should help us to 
understand the other components of the data–information–knowledge 
hierarchy, and so defines knowledge as “information given meaning and 
integrated with other contents of understanding” (p. 1042). She (2005) 
thus also defines data: Data 1 are regarded “as that portion of the entire 
information environment available to a sensing organism that is taken in, 
or processed, by that organism,” while Data 2 are regarded as “informa-
tion selected or generated by human beings for social purposes” (n.p.).
Bates’s overall conception of information can be seen as a variation of 
the information-as-thing category but deserves further consideration; it is 
one of the most widely used definitions in IS, seems to account for many 
forms of information used in other fields, and both specific definitions of 
information (1 and 2) can be seen as having a few noteworthy advantages. 
First, by allowing that some pattern of organization of energy or matter is 
an instance of information, there is similarity of the scope of her defini-
tions to the widespread intuition about the ubiquity of information in the 
world: because we feel that there can be information about everything, it 
seems appropriate that we should be able to define information so broad-
ly. Second, the exclusion of something from the definitions (total entro-
py) seems a good sign, as definitions aim to demarcate that which is being 
defined from that which is not. Third, Bates’s view allows for definitions 
of data and knowledge, which she then relates to information.5 Lastly, the 
“fundamental forms” that Bates outlines are useful characterizations of in-
stances of information, and they likely remain useful regardless of which 
definition of information one adopts. These advantages make a strong 
case for Bates’s definition being one of the richest and most fruitful ef-
forts toward defining information that has come from within IS. As we will 
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see, her view comes very close in its character to the GDI (and thus also 
the SDI), but in its differences, Bates’s view holds a few theoretical and 
practical problems.
The breadth of this account, which contributes to an intuitive strength, 
also contributes to a problematic implication by conflating data with in-
formation. This conflation is similar to the one made by Buckland and 
other varieties of the information-as-thing definition, but not exactly simi-
lar: whereas Buckland conflated physical objects with the information 
they afford, Bates’s conflation is broader, including also patterns, such as 
words, designs, and concepts. Her account makes the same mistake that is 
made in much ordinary use of the word information; this implies that the 
mistake of conflating information with some informational phenomenon 
is easy to make. Therefore, we provide two further examples.
First, assume, as Bates’s view implies, that the words file, fichier, and Datei 
themselves are information. From their differences, it should follow that 
they carry different information. But these words have identical mean-
ing: they carry the same information that enables us to think about some 
objects in the world as computer files. In other words, different patterns 
may afford the same information, and therefore cannot be that informa-
tion. Second, it follows from Bates’s view that smoke itself is the pattern 
of organization of some matter, and hence that smoke is information. Yet, 
what informational content is some smoke identical to? At the outset, the 
obvious information that may be gleaned is that there is a fire, that this 
particular smoke has some color, and so on. But none of these conclu-
sions are smoke itself; rather, they are information yielded by the smoke 
and thus not identical to it. 
By instead viewing information as meaningful and well-formed data, 
we can regard smoke itself as a datum that affords certain information, 
such as those described above, the word smoke as meaningful data that 
refers to the physical smoke, and the words “Datei is German for file” as a 
sentence that carries information. The information is composed of data, 
“such as German” and so on, and these data are meaningful and well-
formed in the context of a linguistic system. 
We said that the breadth of Bates’s account is what produces a prob-
lematic implication. The implication is that patterns are themselves in-
formation, despite there being no obvious informational content pres-
ent and despite differences in the patterns. What a semantic conception 
of information, like the GDI, allows us to see is that Bates’s definition is 
too broad insofar as it includes data, called “patterns” by Bates, and thus 
conflates the components of information with the information that they 
yield.
Bates seems aware of critiques stating that she conflates information 
with data, or something like it: “Some readers of this essay in manuscript 
have argued that this definition of information simply equates information 
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with pattern and that the definition is therefore trivial. I do not follow the 
logic: even if I were doing that, if I could make a good case for that defi-
nition and its usefulness to the field, would that not be a step forward?” 
(2005, n.p.; emphasis in original). That Bates’s view contributes to a step 
forward and advances an understanding of information is a claim with 
which we happily agree, and as we have acknowledged above, we do not 
find her definition trivial. The conclusion, however, that one ought to 
maintain such a definition in light of counterintuitive implications and 
good competing theories seems to us untenable. 
Through a different analysis, Hjørland (2011) arrives at perhaps the 
same problem with Bates’s definition: “I see no need, however, to term 
such differences ‘information.’ This is in my opinion not necessary and 
it is confusing. Differences are thus not information until they inform 
somebody about something” (p. 547). The GDI allows for agreement with 
Hjørland’s view that differences themselves, called diaphora or data, are 
not information. Where the views differ is on Hjørland’s concluding sen-
tence; if written with the GDI in mind, it would read: “Differences are 
thus not information until they are meaningful and related in a well-
formed manner.” 
Given that previous strong definitions of information have theoretical 
weaknesses and counterintuitive implications for practical uses and given 
that we are able to understand these flaws by conceiving of information 
as well-formed and meaningful data, Floridi’s account seems increasingly 
attractive for use in IS. To make the account’s usefulness even clearer, we 
describe a few examples of how it might facilitate understanding the in-
formation aspect of common IS events and items: a nonfiction book is not 
itself information but contains representations of information about the 
world; a valid RDF triplet is not information but is a digital abstraction that 
represents some information by describing three datum as subject, object, 
and predicate; a postings list is a data structure containing representa-
tions of data as words in the keys column and affords information about 
those data via the data in the values column—for example, that the word 
cats occurs in a document collection “forty-five” times; a recipe is a repre-
sentation of instructional information, likely printed on paper or stored 
on a computer; an MP3 file is a certain series of bit values that represent 
audio data in a certain order that people may want to hear; an antelope 
is a physical object that carries certain data, and these may afford us cer-
tain information—for example, that the antelope is healthy; that which 
a web-search user is seeking is information that is represented by text on 
a page, or perhaps by depictions in a photo; and last, an organizational 
shared hard drive is a storage place for files fashioned into documents, 
which contain representations of information pertinent to operations. 
The characterizations in this incomplete list are useful in understand-
ing and discussing the materials and processes of IS practitioners; these 
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illustrate the practical strength of the GDI. It is a theoretical strength 
that the GDI aids in making sense of previous definitions and in doing so 
helps to clarify the theoretical picture produced by all of the previous def-
initions. To demonstrate practical implications, we return to our exam-
ple of the case study of the reference librarian. If defining information- 
as-process as Buckland and others do, the book that the patron is al-
ready knowledgeable about would not be considered information. This 
is counterintuitive and confounded. If defining information as a pat-
tern of matter or energy as Bates does, the blank note-taking paper itself 
would count. This is counterintuitive and problematic. If information is 
defined as well-formed, meaningful data, however, the blank paper would 
not count, but the poetry and redundant book would. The internet URL 
would be considered a datum, itself part of the information that what the 
patron seeks lies at the destination page.
Karamuftuoglu (2009) has argued that IS should concern itself with 
particular definitions of information, focusing on epistemological, aes-
thetic, and ethical angles, and borrow heavily from philosophical meth-
ods in doing so. Here, we have identified one such definition, used in 
the PI, that is theoretically sound and useful in describing common IS 
concerns.
GDI, SDI, and the Role of Truth in Information
Now that we have illustrated the usefulness of a view of information as 
well-formed, meaningful data for understanding both common IS-related 
contexts and the theoretical framework resulting from many previous 
definitions, we must address our reasoning for preferring the GDI over 
the strongly semantic definition of information (SDI). To recap, the SDI 
is identical to the GDI but has an additional, fourth criterion: for x to be 
information, x must be true. The relationship between truth and informa-
tion (and librarianship) is an established topic of interest in both philoso-
phy and IS (Floridi, 2004c; Labaree & Scimeca, 2008). Floridi (2004a) 
himself prefers the SDI for philosophical uses; for IS, however, he only 
takes us as far as a general semantic concept of information, noting that 
librarianship specifically deals not with knowledge but with “contents un-
derstood as meaningful data . . . connected with the activity of steward-
ship of a semantic environment” (p. 662). 
The claim that x must be true to be information has been made inde-
pendently of the SDI, under the name “the veridicality thesis.” Motivations 
for maintaining this thesis range from intuitive, such as that a transparent 
lie does not seem informative and false information is not information 
any more than a rubber duck is a duck (Dretske, 1981), to a technical 
paradox resulting from allowing information to be false (Floridi, 2004b, 
2004c).6 Floridi’s conclusion from this paradox, that information must 
be true, manifests in SDI.4 and has been further formalized by Cevolani 
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(2011). As far as we can discern, it is often unclear in explications of the 
SDI whether or not this requirement extends beyond factual information: 
instructional information is explicitly absolved of the requirement, but 
categories like poetry and fiction are often not discussed.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the veridicality thesis is contentious within phi-
losophy. Against it, Fetzer (2004a) demonstrates various linguistic instances 
where requiring truth obscures the differences among information, mis-
information, and nontruth-evaluable sentences. Similarly, Scarantino and 
Piccinini (2010) point out more nontruth-evaluable claims as well as list 
examples from computer science that are false, yet informative. In an at-
tempt to avoid the need for the veridicality thesis, Primiero (2009) for-
malizes a logical approach to describing information that does not rely 
upon a notion of truth and thus does not arrive at such paradoxes. In 
retort to arguments like these, Floridi (2005) has provided reasons why 
various resistances to the veridicality thesis are flawed. 
Like many topics in philosophy, the debate surrounding the veridical-
ity thesis remains unsettled. Even the distinction among information, mis-
information, and disinformation are debated (for example, Fallis & Car-
lin, 2011; Fetzer, 2004b). Fortunately, commitment to a definition need 
not be made on theoretical grounds alone; in light of disagreement about 
the veridicality thesis, it may be argued that whichever position is more 
practically useful should be adopted.
The practical motivations for IS to either adopt or ignore the veridical-
ity thesis are a relatively untouched topic. Might there be practical con-
cerns for IS that would favor an opposite view, to allow that x need not 
be true to be considered information? We think so. First, there may be 
content in frequent IS practice that we regard to be information that is 
false, disputed, or not truth-evaluable. Consider categories like fiction, 
instructions, recipes, poetry, conversation logs in e-mails and on paper, 
and abandoned notions like old laws of nature once held in high regard 
by the scientific community. Poetry may be nontruth-evaluable, the claims 
in astrology books are disputed, and it is unclear if reports about fictional 
characters are true, false, or neither. Some of these categories get a “free 
pass” by some implementations of the veridicality thesis (for example, Flo-
ridi’s view of instructional information and recipes), but other categories 
are not addressed, and some others, like fiction, do not pass as informa-
tion. All of them, however, are of interest to information professionals 
and researchers, as well as to our patrons, students, users, and clients, 
perhaps as much as factual information, and so their exclusion from the 
definition of information seems unwanted. 
If the debate about the veridicality thesis remains unsettled, it seems 
more useful to regard the contents of these categories as information. 
The extra restriction that the veridicality thesis adds to the SDI over and 
above the GDI serves only purely theoretical motivations, such as to avoid 
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paradoxes that manifest in the technical writings of philosophers. By con-
trast, allowing poetry to qualify as information would incur neither a par-
adox for nor obstacle to reading it but would instead allow it to be usefully 
categorized, sorted, archived, filed, retrieved, borrowed, and consumed 
alongside other information, regardless of its alethic value. That there 
seem to be so many cases of fictitious, disputed, and nontruth-evaluable 
information in IS may actually be a reason against an even purely theo-
retical acceptance of the SDI: it is highly counterintuitive.
What if the veridicality thesis is true? In discussing philosophers’ re-
sistance to the thesis, Floridi (2010b) acknowledges that utility often re-
quires a tempering of pedantry in applied contexts: 
It would be daft, for example, to identify a piece of software as infor-
mation—as we ordinarily do in IT and computer science—and then 
argue that, since information must be true, so must be that piece of 
software. “True about what?” would be the right skeptical question. 
Likewise, it would be unduly pedantic to insist that, given the veridical-
ity thesis, cognitive scientists should stop speaking about information 
processes. (p. 406) 
The same applies to IS contexts in which information is either not obvi-
ously true or truth-evaluable.
Lastly, Budd (2011) and Lingard (2013) have emphasized the impor-
tance for a good theory of information to address the relationship be-
tween truth and information. Lingard, however, disagrees with Budd that 
information requires truth, arguing instead that information has onto-
logical primacy, and truth and meaning are thus properties of informa-
tion rather than being necessary for its existence. We agree and think 
that a useful way that the GDI could therefore be expanded to address 
the relationship between information and truth, while still giving onto-
logical primacy to information and thus avoiding the veridicality thesis, 
would be to regard truth as a sufficient condition for information rather 
than a necessary one: if x can be regarded as true, then it must meet all 
of the criteria of the GDI and so x can be regarded as information. This 
complements Fox’s (1983) view that information does not require truth, 
but misinformation requires falsity. In this way, truth serves as a shortcut 
to identifying information rather than an obstacle. Our position that the 
GDI is preferable to the SDI for use in IS also complements the work of 
Labaree and Scimeca (2008) in which they argue that “library practice 
requires a suspension of truth” (p. 67) to be fully purposeful, extending 
the sentiment to conclude that truth, although important, needs to be 
usefully limited for our domain.
Conclusion
We have endeavored to show that the GDI is a suitable working definition 
of information for use in IS. To do this, we addressed concerns about the 
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prospect and necessity of finding such a definition; although a unified 
theory of information may be impossible, a discipline-dependent defini-
tion is desirable and may suffice for internal uses. This is more desirable, 
we think, than avoiding the use of the term information and choosing a 
position of ignorance about the main phenomenon of our field. We have 
also made some sense of the “many definitions problem” by analyzing the 
shortcomings of two accounts that have received much attention, one of 
which is, in turn, a categorization of previous definitions. In utilizing the 
GDI for this task, we have demonstrated the theoretical strengths of Flo-
ridi’s view of information as meaningful, well-formed semantic data. In 
short, Buckland’s (1991) view of information-as-thing conflates informa-
tion with the object that yields it; information-as-process and information-
as-knowledge conflate information with particular processes and knowl-
edge in which information is featured; and Bates’s view of information 
as patterns of energy conflates information with data. We have provided 
concrete examples of how the GDI describes and helps us to understand 
the common practice and research concerns of IS. Lastly, we have demon-
strated reasons for favoring the GDI over the SDI, in light of the needs of 
IS practitioners and researchers. Floridi (2010b) has noted that philoso-
phers do not complain about grocery stores putting tomatoes and cour-
gette in the vegetables section, despite the fact that they are actually fruit. 
Similarly, if the veridicality thesis is true, it may not matter much to IS 
because we have found a framework useful for going about our business. 
Like Floridi’s account of the grocer, we would never chide someone 
for asking “have you attached the information?” even if by the definitions 
promoted here the attachment is really a file that contains representa-
tions of data. Instead, we are here promoting the view that information 
scientists and professionals be able to quite precisely and confidently 
define information, and in turn data, and use the words both technically 
and informally but with acuity and knowledge of the differences: name-
ly, that data are the values of any identifiable differences; information is 
well-formed, meaningful data; and for the purposes of our field, infor-
mation need not be true. The examples we have provided are primarily 
concerned with identifying and understanding what information is; when 
a definition is needed to identify information in research or practice, we 
recommend the GDI. There are instances in IS, however, such as studies 
in information retrieval, that may need to quantify information as well. 
Fortunately, the GDI can be complementary to quantitative approaches to 
understanding information; for example, Chen and Floridi (2013) have 
used both Floridi’s GDI and Shannon and Weaver’s MTC to analyze visual 
information, using the former to identify and the latter to quantify infor-
mation.
The result of this analysis, we hope, is that the search for a definition 
of information has been advanced and need not be suspended. It is ad-
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vanced insofar as we have defended an existing definition rather than 
posited an additional definition without critically examining its implica-
tion for previous definitions. If the search were to be suspended, it would 
not be because we have found a perfect definition nor have given up look-
ing for an acceptable one, but because we have found one that is coher-
ent and useful for both applied and theoretical purposes. Zins (2007) 
has suggested that the field must adapt its understanding of fundamental 
concepts to match their evolving applications. Our perspective is that it 
will take another information revolution to make the GDI obsolete.
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Notes
 1. These and other applied theories of information do not define the essence of information 
but rather quantify information or characterize how it works. Nevertheless, they are often 
still philosophical, interesting, and very helpful for understanding the various aspects of 
information. See Cohen and Meskin (2006) for one such example of philosophical writ-
ings about information theory, which usefully detail how information “works” in several 
contexts. What they do not do, however, is state the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for identifying information. 
 2. Adriaans (2010) describes Floridi’s account of information as “orthogonal” to quantita-
tive accounts found in physics and computer science and concludes that it is actually 
contradictory to such accounts (p. 41). Despite this view, Chen and Floridi (2013) have 
used both Shannon and Weaver’s MTC and Floridi’s GDI to analyze visual information, 
demonstrating that quantitative and qualitative accounts can be complementary.
 3. Although widely accepted at face value, this reading of Bateson is contested by Sloman 
(2011).
 4. Bates states that her view implies that information is emergent—that is, novel and irreduc-
ible to its component parts. That information is emergent actually seems contrary to her 
definitions, however, because all of them are constructed solely in terms of their parts, 
and none are demonstrated to be irreducible to those parts.
 5. The degree of usefulness of Bates’s definition of knowledge is necessarily limited to the 
few paragraphs of explanation to which she has confined it. Given the rich history of 
understanding and defining knowledge that has been contributed by philosophers, it is 
unclear why it is desirable to formulate one ex nihilo rather than to draw on a definition 
that has the benefit of centuries of refinement.
 6. This problem is dubbed the “Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox”: if information content can be 
gleaned from the set of possible worlds excluded by its truth, then logical contradictions 
have maximal information content because they exclude all possible worlds. This is ex-
plained further in Floridi (2004c).
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